Hegel, Autonomy, and Social Freedom

Abstract This paper challenges a prominent interpretation of Hegel’s theory of recognition according to which Hegel’s account of recognition resolves what has been called the ‘paradox of autonomy’ by socializing the act of self-legislation. The paradox arises because autonomy seems to require both that only self-legislated norms are binding, yet the act of self- legislation presupposes that we are already bound by norms. Against this interpretation, I argue that Hegel does not posit self-legislation as a necessary condition for the bindingness of norms. Rather, he maintains that norms are binding in so far as they can be shown to be necessary for the realization of freedom. I develop an alternative reading based on Hegel’s critique of Kantian formalism and his institutional conception of freedom. On this account, norms and institutions are binding only to the extent that they realize social freedom—not because they are self-legislated.