Penal Populism and the Failure of Its Core Claims

Abstract Contemporary criminal justice systems have been consistently reliant on punitive measures, often justified on grounds of effectiveness and/or public support. This study aims to assess the extent to which such justificatory claims can indeed be upheld; and thus, whether penal populism can sustain critical scrutiny to its claims. This article adopts a critical and integrative theoretical approach, drawing on criminology, restrained retributivism, the sociology of punishment, and public opinion studies. The article concludes that penal populism fails to substantiate its claims on criminological, moral, or democratic grounds. As such, it demonstrates that appeals to the claims penal populism makes cannot be defended by reference to those very claims. This indicates that penal populism is internally incoherent, lacking a sound justificatory reasoning, appealing instead to emotions, not reason. Future studies should aim at developing an alternative framework for penal policy that addresses the persistence of populist penal policies, despite the fallacy of their claims.