The political turn of the extended mind: rethinking autonomy beyond individualism in a technological world

Abstract The extended mind thesis (EXT) has profoundly reshaped debates about the nature and boundaries of cognition. Yet its ethical and political implications remain underexplored. While much of the literature emphasizes the therapeutic and enhancement promises of cognitive technologies, less attention has been paid to the structural risks associated with technological dependence, including deskilling, mental manipulation, and the illusion of agency. This article investigates the normative consequences that follow if we take EXT seriously. Rather than defending EXT as a metaphysical claim, I treat it as a working assumption and ask: what ethical and political commitments does it entail? I argue that responses centered on epistemic virtue and cognitive diligence, though valuable, remain insufficient because they presuppose an individualistic framework inconsistent with EXT’s anti-individualism. If cognition is genuinely extended across socio-technical systems, responsibility for safeguarding autonomy cannot rest solely on individual agents. Drawing on feminist theories of relational autonomy, I develop the notion of extended autonomy and contend that EXT implies not only a reconceptualization of agency, but also a political reorientation. The design, ownership, and governance of cognitive technologies become matters of democratic concern. The risks of mental manipulation, cognitive expropriation, and structural domination require institutional and legal responses rather than appeals to personal virtue. Ultimately, I argue that EXT should not remain confined to debates in philosophy of mind. It entails commitments to reshaping the socio-technical environments that partly constitute cognition itself, and thus to democratizing the conditions under which autonomous agency is realized.