Why Does Mengzi Consider Human Nature Good?

Abstract This essay examines the theoretical relation between moral sentiments and the goodness of human nature in Mengzi's moral philosophy. Mengzi's claim that human nature is good is often understood through the heart of compassion and the sages' exemplary achievements. I argue that both approaches are incomplete: they show how the moral potential is actualized but insufficiently explains how the goodness of human nature itself is recognized or validated. Instead, I argue that Mengzi also suggests a spectatorial account of moral evaluation. From the spectator's standpoint, we discern goodness through shared sentiments of approbation, which are grounded in the hearts of shame and approval. Our approvals of virtuous agents function to indicate their goodness and provide empirical support for the claim that human nature contains an inherent potential for goodness. I show the merit of this spectatorial perspective with an enriched interpretation of 3A1, where the claim that human nature is good first appears. By combining agential and spectatorial perspectives, Mengzi develops a coherent account of the goodness of human nature that encourages agential moral self‐cultivation, strengthened from a spectatorial examination of goodness.