‘ALLOWING THE MOST CAPABLE TO LEAD’: ELITE LEADERSHIP, COMPETENCY, AND CAPACITY IN THE FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN STRATĒGIA

This paper interrogates the paradox of military leadership in the Athenian democracy within the analytical framework of mass and elite political negotiation. Although the stratēgia (the Athenian generalship) was filled by election rather than by democratic lottery, thereby privileging wealthy, notable citizens as candidates for office, the institution simultaneously incorporated robust democratic oversight and availed the dēmos of benefits that attended the personal networks of the Athenian elite. Building on seminal works on the stratēgia , the paper demonstrates that the seemingly undemocratic selection of generals was, in fact, a deliberate mechanism that not only harnessed elite expertise but also allowed the dēmos to leverage the personal ties ( xenia and philia ) and foreign resources of the men they elected as generals. I argue that the stratēgia should not be understood simply as an exception to democratic ideals but as a sophisticated institution that balanced elite capacity and claims to honours with both public oversight and public benefaction.