Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa

In 1929, the British Empire launched a four-decade development initiative to modernize colonial economies without self-government. Known as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, the program required colonial administrations to raise local taxes to cofinance development projects. This article shows that imperial aid expanded colonial taxation only after organizational reforms in the Colonial Service screened in officials who shared the metropole’s developmental agenda and made tax mobilization incentive-compatible with career advancement. Drawing on original data from 12 African colonies and extensive archival evidence, I show that aid increased tax revenues when patronage-based governors were replaced by career officers and promotion within the Colonial Service became conditional on fiscal performance. These findings highlight how bureaucratic incentives shaped the effectiveness of imperial aid and offer a new explanation for the expansion of fiscal capacity in late colonial Africa.

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Publication Details

Journal
American Political Science Review
Published
2026-09-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101919
Primary Topic
Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa

Didac Queralt
American Political Science Review
Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
article

Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa

Didac Queralt
article en

Abstract

In 1929, the British Empire launched a four-decade development initiative to modernize colonial economies without self-government. Known as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, the program required colonial administrations to raise local taxes to cofinance development projects. This article shows that imperial aid expanded colonial taxation only after organizational reforms in the Colonial Service screened in officials who shared the metropole’s developmental agenda and made tax mobilization incentive-compatible with career advancement. Drawing on original data from 12 African colonies and extensive archival evidence, I show that aid increased tax revenues when patronage-based governors were replaced by career officers and promotion within the Colonial Service became conditional on fiscal performance. These findings highlight how bureaucratic incentives shaped the effectiveness of imperial aid and offer a new explanation for the expansion of fiscal capacity in late colonial Africa.

American Political Science Review
Yale University (US)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
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Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa — Didac Queralt · American Political Science Review (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS