Strategic Coercion and International Mediation of Atrocity-related Conflict

Scholars note that coercive mediation, involving sanctions, military, and judicial tools, underpins success in atrocity-related conflicts. Coercive devices can create a hurting stalemate and conflict ripeness, preventing serious human rights violations from sliding into atrocities/genocide. The puzzle is that coercive instruments are often counterproductive, raising questions about their roles, mechanisms, actors, and how we interpret success. I develop the framework of coercive mediation to address this puzzle. I draw on coercion theory, particularly strategic coercion, and mediation concepts, such as the enticing opportunity model of ripeness, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, and power mediation. The central theory is that conflict parties are legitimate, rational, voluntary agents who always have choices, even when coerced, and that conflict ripeness is inherent in peace proposals. So, mediators and coercing powers supporting mediation efforts must first create ripeness by producing enticing peace plans, then deploy coercive mechanisms to influence reluctant parties’ choices. I probe and establish the theory’s analytical significance using the “crucial” and controversial case of Kenya. This article offers fresh insights into persistent theoretical debates among mediation scholars on the causes of conflict ripeness and mediation success. The coercive mediation framework is a conceptual tool for studying coercion in international mediation.