The long coup: how decree-laws rewired the Turkish state

Abstract This article examines how the Turkish government used executive decree-laws ( Kanun Hükmünde Kararnameler ; KHKs) during the 2016–2018 state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. While existing literature often treats executive aggrandizement as a symptom of democratic backsliding, this study focuses on how it was institutionally implemented through legal instruments. Drawing on qualitative content analysis of thirty-seven KHKs, thirty-two emergency and five ordinary, the article shows how these decrees enabled the government to bypass legislative and judicial oversight, marginalize rivals, and restructure key state institutions. The analysis is guided by three interrelated theoretical lenses: populism; competitive authoritarianism; and neo-patrimonialism. Rather than responding solely to security threats, the KHKs functioned as tools of regime change, allowing the executive to consolidate power through formal legal means. The article contributes to the study of autocratization by demonstrating how legal mechanisms under emergency rule can be used to entrench autocratic governance. It offers a typology of decree-law functions in Turkey’s post-coup period and highlights the role of executive lawmaking in the long-term reordering of state authority.