Field-Network Theory From Experiential Events Beyond Genealogical Continuation

Field-Network Theory (FNT) is an event-based ontological and physical research program that investigates whether the structures used in physical description can be reconstructed from occurrence itself, without assuming background time, background space, fundamental persistent objects, a pre-existing field, a ready-made future, or a fundamental observer. The central methodological question is simple to state but demanding to pursue: How much of physical reality can be reconstructed from occurrence without silently reintroducing the structures that were removed from the starting point? FNT begins from complete occurrence, denoted by C. Occurrence is not initially defined as a change undergone by an already existing object, nor as an event located within an independently existing spacetime. Instead, the research program asks whether familiar physical structures—including continuity, time, spatial relations, form, mass, quantum phenomena, gravitation, and ultimately observable physical behavior—can emerge from a relational structure grounded in occurrence. This reverses the usual explanatory direction. Rather than beginning with objects, states, fields, space and time and asking how they evolve, FNT asks what must be structurally available for such descriptions to become possible in the first place. From physical description to ontological reconstruction Modern physics provides extraordinarily successful mathematical descriptions of nature. FNT does not dispute that empirical success. Its question concerns a different level of explanation: whether the conceptual structures appearing in successful physical theories must therefore be regarded as fundamental structures of reality. A coordinate can be indispensable to a physical calculation without proving that coordinate space is ontologically fundamental. A clock can measure time without establishing background time as a fundamental substance or container. A particle description can predict observations without demonstrating that persistent particles are the deepest constituents of reality. FNT therefore distinguishes operational success from ontological fundamentality. The research program deliberately removes several familiar structures from its initial assumptions and then investigates whether they can be recovered rather than presupposed. These include: background time, background space, persistent fundamental objects, fundamental motion relative to a pre-existing spacetime, a fundamental field that exists independently of occurrence, ready-made future states or worlds, an assumed fundamental observer, and an automatic identification of non-determinism with randomness. Removing these structures is not itself offered as a physical theory. It defines the starting conditions of a reconstruction problem. Complete occurrence and relational structure In FNT, C denotes a complete occurrence. Completeness is not defined by clock duration. An event measured across several chronological intervals need not therefore consist of several ontologically fundamental occurrences. Conversely, a short measured duration does not establish ontological unity. This distinction opens a research problem concerning the relationship between chronological decomposition and event-based decomposition. FNT further investigates how occurrence can produce relational structure without requiring a persistent bearer underneath successive events. The field-network is therefore not introduced as a container in which events happen. The term refers to the common relational structure of occurrence. In current FNT terminology this structure is denoted by D: D = the common relational structure of occurrence. D is not a collection or archive of event-objects, a sequence of world states, background spacetime, or a pre-existing stage. The research problem is instead whether occurrence and its relational articulation can provide the structural continuity normally attributed to persistent objects or independently existing backgrounds. This distinction is important because an occurrence need not remain as an object in order for reality after that occurrence to be structurally different. Possibility without a pre-existing future FNT also separates possibility from a ready-made future. Possibility is denoted by e and is currently treated as a relational possibility to manifest as such. A possible occurrence is not thereby an already existing future event, branch, world, or object waiting to be selected. Likewise: possibility does not imply occurrence. This allows FNT to investigate possibility without beginning from an ontologically completed space of alternative futures. One developing concept within this framework is structural avoidance: occurrence may find another way to continue without any agent consciously selecting the alternative. Structural avoidance does not by itself determine the next complete occurrence, nor does it establish probabilities, weighting among possibilities, or ontological indeterminism. It instead identifies a research direction in which relational structure may permit occurrence to articulate differently without requiring an external controller or predetermined route. The possible relationship between relational possibility e, structural avoidance, and the direction of occurrence remains an open part of the research program. Ontological reduction and its boundary A major part of the FNT research-paper series concerns the limits of ontological reduction. Removing an assumed foundation does not automatically explain what remains. Nor does showing that certain conditions are compatible with an occurrence explain why occurrence occurs. This produces an important distinction between conditions of manifestation and occurrence itself. The research program therefore examines where structural derivation succeeds, where it requires an additional positive assumption, and where an explanatory boundary has been reached. Negative results are significant within this methodology. If a conclusion cannot be derived from a proposed structural basis, FNT does not automatically repair the derivation by inserting another primitive mechanism. Instead, the failure identifies the boundary of what the stated conditions actually establish. This makes the research program intentionally revisable. Concepts proposed in the broad construction can later be restricted, reformulated, separated from stronger interpretations, or left open when subsequent analysis shows that the original derivation was insufficient. The book and the research-paper series Field-Network Theory — A Hypothesis on the Structure of Reality presents the broad constructive form of the theory. The book explores, from a common ontological starting point, questions concerning time, space, form, quantum structure, light, mass, gravitation, cosmology, and consciousness. Its purpose is to make the proposed world-structure visible as a whole rather than presenting FNT only as a collection of isolated propositions. This role is important. A sufficiently complete formal system may encode a structure without making the resulting whole immediately recognizable. In the same way that a complete mathematical description of a biological form is not identical to recognizing the organism represented by that description, individual equations and propositions do not necessarily reveal the world-model they jointly describe. The book therefore provides the integrated conceptual construction of FNT: a view of how a familiar observable world might look if its underlying explanatory order begins from occurrence rather than from objects situated in pre-existing space and time. The research papers perform a different task. They separate individual load-bearing claims from the whole and subject them to stricter examination. A paper can ask whether a proposed conclusion genuinely follows from its premises, whether it depends on a particular representation, whether a hidden assumption has entered the argument, whether a countermodel is possible, or whether an ontological reduction has reached its legitimate boundary. The relationship is therefore not simply: book → proof → completed theory. It is closer to: broad construction → structural decomposition → independent testing → revision → reconstruction. The book makes the proposed whole visible. The papers investigate whether its individual structural joints can carry the explanatory load assigned to them. A background-independent research direction FNT belongs to the broader family of foundational questions concerning background independence, relational ontology, event ontology, emergence, foundations of spacetime, foundations of quantum theory, and the ontology of physical law, while proposing its own event-based starting point. Its strongest ambition is not merely to reinterpret existing terminology. The long-term question is whether measurable physics can actually be reconstructed from this basis. A successful development would therefore need to establish bridges from the ontological structure to physical quantities and ultimately to testable consequences capable of distinguishing FNT from alternative descriptions. That task is not claimed to be complete. At its present stage, FNT should therefore be understood as an open physical and ontological research program, not as an experimentally established replacement for contemporary physics or a completed theory of everything. Its current contribution is the construction and systematic examination of a different explanatory architecture: What if occurrence is fundamental, while objects, continuity, time, space, fields, and other familiar structures must earn their place through reconstruction? The book develops the resulting world-picture. The research-paper series tests its structure piece by piece. Together they investigate whether a physical description can move from occurrence to structure, and from str