Cross-Provider Decomposition Attack Detection for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening
This disclosure describes a hardware-isolated cross-provider decomposition attack detection architecture for nucleic acid synthesis screening. Nucleic acid synthesis security screening currently operates at the level of a single order submitted to a single provider, leaving a structural gap: a sequence of concern can be split into multiple lower-risk segments and ordered from different providers, at different times, or under different apparent requester identities, so that no individual segment triggers the risk classification that would apply to the assembled construct. This design closes that gap with a hardware-isolated cumulative risk ledger. Each participating synthesis provider's own hardware security module generates a signed contribution token for every screened order, combining a zero-knowledge requester identity commitment with a privacy-preserving sequence risk descriptor. These tokens are aggregated by a coordinating ledger that can detect a cumulative cross-provider risk pattern without any provider learning another provider's customer identities or order content. When cumulative risk crosses a configured threshold, the ledger raises an escalation flag that can feed a physical synthesis interlock (see the author's companion disclosure, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22216258), withholding or revoking that machine's attestation token for the order in question. The architecture depends on provider participation. It does not reach synthesis performed on equipment operated entirely outside the participating network, including by a state or non-state actor running its own non-participating capability, and it does not perform the underlying sequence classification itself, which remains a separate screening pipeline. Published as a voluntary defensive publication under a CC0 1.0 Universal public domain dedication to establish prior art. No patent rights are sought or reserved for the subject matter described herein. This dedication does not extend to other technology that may be the subject of separate, pending patent applications by the author or Supernova Technologies Inc. Author: Brian Andrew Digate. Published by: Supernova Technologies Inc., Madison, Wisconsin.
Authors
- Brian Digate (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8896-6579)
Institutions
- Association of Super-Advanced Electronics (JP)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-09-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22833862
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00