Intuitions of compromise: Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, contractualism

What is the best compromise in a situation where different people value different things? The most common method for answering this question is to look at all the options, add up the utility per person associated with each, and pick the option with the largest sum. This approach seems like the obvious, theory-neutral solution, though, in fact, it relies on substantive utilitarian commitments. A second, quite common approach, involves integrating egalitarian concerns, and picking an option that trades off maximizing utility with equalizing outcomes. But there is an important, though often-ignored, third approach as well: a contractualist approach, which models what rational actors would agree to. In this paper, we test the proposals of these three competing preference aggregation algorithms in social decision-making contexts that are systematically sampled across a wide range. While the dominant approach to value aggregation up to now has been utilitarian, we find that participants strongly prefer the aggregations recommended by the contractualist algorithm, which also dominates the egalitarian approach across a range of parameterizations. Finally, we compare the judgments of large language models (LLMs) to those of our (human) participants, finding important misalignment between model and human preferences.

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Publication Details

Journal
Cognition
Published
2026-09-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106694
Primary Topic
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Intuitions of compromise: Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, contractualism

Jared Moore, Yejin Choi, Sydney Levine
Cognition
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
article

Intuitions of compromise: Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, contractualism

Jared Moore, Yejin Choi, Sydney Levine
article en

Abstract

What is the best compromise in a situation where different people value different things? The most common method for answering this question is to look at all the options, add up the utility per person associated with each, and pick the option with the largest sum. This approach seems like the obvious, theory-neutral solution, though, in fact, it relies on substantive utilitarian commitments. A second, quite common approach, involves integrating egalitarian concerns, and picking an option that trades off maximizing utility with equalizing outcomes. But there is an important, though often-ignored, third approach as well: a contractualist approach, which models what rational actors would agree to. In this paper, we test the proposals of these three competing preference aggregation algorithms in social decision-making contexts that are systematically sampled across a wide range. While the dominant approach to value aggregation up to now has been utilitarian, we find that participants strongly prefer the aggregations recommended by the contractualist algorithm, which also dominates the egalitarian approach across a range of parameterizations. Finally, we compare the judgments of large language models (LLMs) to those of our (human) participants, finding important misalignment between model and human preferences.

CognitionVol. 278
New York University (US), Stanford University (US)
Templeton World Charity Foundation, Office of Naval Research, Defense Sciences Office, DARPA
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
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