Design of Co-creation Mechanisms in Blockchain Games: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective
The gaming industry is undergoing a significant transformation with the emergence of blockchain games, which leverage blockchain technology to enhance transparency and player autonomy. However, despite their potential, blockchain games face several challenges, including limited entertainment value, low player engagement, and insufficient collaboration among developers. To address these issues, we propose the “Blockchain Game Co-creation Mechanism”. This mechanism encourages open-source collaboration by allowing developers to propose new game forks and share profits transparently based on their contributions. The original developer, other developers, and players all play key roles in this ecosystem, shaping the game's development through continuous iteration and feedback. To analyze the strategic interactions among these parties, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model. We use replicator dynamics to examine how different strategic choices, such as cooperation or competition between developers, and player loyalty or switching, affect the stability and evolution of the game ecosystem. Our simulation experiments reveal the conditions under which the ecosystem thrives, offering theoretical insights and practical guidelines for promoting a healthy and vibrant blockchain gaming environment.
Authors
- Haoran Yin (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-8773-1246)
- Wei Cai (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4658-0034)
- Rong Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-0904-2073)
- Jiaxiang Sun (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-0840-0621)
Institutions
- Shenzhen University (CN)
- University of Washington (US)
- Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen (CN)
- Shenzhen Technology University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Distributed Ledger Technologies Research and Practice
- Published
- 2026-09-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3848027
- Primary Topic
- Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00