Responsibility Without Superiority: An Epistemic Account of Human Duty in the Anthropocene

Anthropocene environmental ethics faces a dilemma: Rejecting anthropocentric notions of superiority often leads to a gap in the justification of human duties. If humans are not ontologically superior, why should they bear specific responsibilities? This article develops the concept of “epistemic obligation” as an alternative foundation for human responsibility that is based neither on hierarchy nor on instrumental utility. To achieve this goal, the following research question is posed: How can humans’ asymmetric responsibility for nonhuman life be justified without presupposing a hierarchical status? The approach involves a critical analysis of existing models; furthermore, a new ethical foundation is developed by incorporating recent epistemic debates and devising concrete application scenarios. The results make it clear that responsibility stems from the epistemic capacity to anticipate consequences, not from ontological status. This model resolves the tension between equality and the necessity to act and offers concrete guidelines for political decision-making processes.