Lack of Separation of Powers of Government or Resource Pressure? Explaining Threats to Judicial Independence in 28 European Jurisdictions

Abstract Based on the pooling of three datasets (ENCJ, CEPEJ, CCP) and using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM), this paper tests two hypotheses about threats to judicial independence in 28 European Jurisdictions (from 26 countries). While the separation of powers hypothesis (hypothesis 1) predicts that judicial independence is directly threatened by the involvement of external branches of government in the budgeting process of the judiciary, the resource pressure hypothesis (hypothesis 2) predicts that judicial independence is indirectly threatened by the involvement of all branches of government in the budgeting process of the judiciary through the exertion of resource pressure. In partial and tentative support of hypothesis 1, direct legislative involvement in the budget process is found to slightly undermine perceived judicial independence, while executive involvement does not. In partial and more robust support of hypothesis 2, it is found that the exertion of budgetary pressure by the legislature and the judiciary, but not the executive, negatively affects perceived judicial independence. This study shows that more than direct involvement in the budgeting process by external branches of government per se, it is the use of involvement in the budgeting process to exert resource pressure on the judiciary that threatens judicial independence.