Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups

ABSTRACT Most people are suspicious of conspiracy theories. The claims that water fluoridation is mass poisoning, that the UN deliberately released the COVID‐19 virus, and that George Bush was responsible for 9/11 are, to many of us, obviously absurd. Nevertheless, it has proven surprisingly difficult to explain why we should be suspicious of conspiracy theories as a class , in any general way. In this article, I present a solution to this problem. I identify a general feature of conspiracy theories and argue that this feature makes it impossible for high credences regarding conspiracy theories to be rationally justified. More specifically, I argue that conspiracy theories are claims that, if true, imply that certain skeptical‐hypothesis‐like claims “cover‐up claims” are extremely likely to be true. As a consequence, if we think that high credences regarding skeptical hypotheses cannot be rationally justified, we should also think that high credences regarding conspiracy theories cannot be justified.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Published
2026-09-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70161
Primary Topic
Misinformation and Its Impacts
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
article

Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups

Austin Raye Ploeger
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Misinformation and Its Impacts
article

Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups

Austin Raye Ploeger
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT Most people are suspicious of conspiracy theories. The claims that water fluoridation is mass poisoning, that the UN deliberately released the COVID‐19 virus, and that George Bush was responsible for 9/11 are, to many of us, obviously absurd. Nevertheless, it has proven surprisingly difficult to explain why we should be suspicious of conspiracy theories as a class , in any general way. In this article, I present a solution to this problem. I identify a general feature of conspiracy theories and argue that this feature makes it impossible for high credences regarding conspiracy theories to be rationally justified. More specifically, I argue that conspiracy theories are claims that, if true, imply that certain skeptical‐hypothesis‐like claims “cover‐up claims” are extremely likely to be true. As a consequence, if we think that high credences regarding skeptical hypotheses cannot be rationally justified, we should also think that high credences regarding conspiracy theories cannot be justified.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Misinformation and Its Impacts
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Conspiracy Theories and Conspiratorial Cover‐Ups — Austin Raye Ploeger · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS