The Intersection Between False Readiness Theory and Negative Hybrid Peace: The Case of Afghanistan

This article argues that the failure of the intra-Afghan negotiations was due to the interplay between the false readiness of the conflicting parties and negative hybrid peace efforts. Both the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Movement of the Taliban demonstrated insufficient interest in a negotiated resolution to the conflict during the intra-Afghan peace talks. This deficiency in commitment stems from power dynamics and the United States-Taliban agreement signed on 29 February 2020 in Doha, which influenced the parties’ approaches to peace. The study deploys “False Readiness Theory” as its main theoretical framework and negative hybrid peace as its central conceptual base to demonstrate their intersection in the context of the Afghan peace process. Data were collected primary and secondary sources using qualitative approach, primarily through interviews with members of the negotiating team and former officials of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This article critically exposes the deep connection between false readiness theory and the negative hybrid peace approach in Afghanistan, directly challenging the dominant view that the hybrid peace model best suits conflict-affected societies. It further examines the model’s theoretical and practical implications, while highlighting key limitations and offering recommendations.