Barriers to institutional convergence in Europe

Abstract Why do some dimensions of governance converge across countries while others persistently diverge? We argue that convergence depends on what reform puts at stake: institutions that build state capacity usually face little resistance from incumbent elites, while those that redistribute political power often encounter more opposition. We order five World Bank governance indicators along this spectrum and, for 41 European countries over 1996–2024, identify Phillips–Sul convergence clubs and link club membership to pre-1996 elite-power concentration. The gap between a dimension’s best and worst club widens with the stakes: Government Effectiveness forms a single club, Voice and Accountability splits into three plus divergent cases, and the others fall in between. Where reform redistributes power, countries with more concentrated elite power often end up in lower-performing groups, especially for accountability and, to a lesser extent, for regulatory quality. Among EU members, similarities in accountability predate accession, pointing to ex ante selection rather than harmonization.