US Influence in Post‐Assad Syria and the Limits of Turkey's Leverage

Abstract In early 2026, the post‐Assad government in Damascus weakened the Kurdish‐led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and began integrating the group through phased incorporation and gradual reassertion of state authority. While this advanced some Turkish objectives, it demonstrated the limits of Ankara's influence: Kurdish fighters were incorporated into Syria's military in SDF brigades rather than as individuals. This article contends that Turkey's access, proximity, and coercive capacity did not allow it to impose its preferences. Political and economic costs limited Turkey's ability to use military force to secure a preferable outcome. Instead, Syria's actions were shaped by its need to preserve security functions that counter the Islamic State, and to continue its international financial and diplomatic reintegration. In addition to underscoring the boundaries of Turkish leverage, the article demonstrates that the United States continues to affect the post‐Assad order through security, financial, and diplomatic means. American influence operates less through direct control than by shaping the conditions under which alternative outcomes become feasible. Given the competing external powers seeking to advance their interests, Syria will likely remain loosely unitary and asymmetrically integrated.