How to improve the market-based allocation mechanism of water rights for irrigation water users in China: a four-party game perspective

Promoting market-based trading in irrigation water rights and improving allocation mechanisms are critical for strengthening water governance and advancing sustainable agricultural development. This study develops a four-party evolutionary game model involving local government (LCG), irrigation district management unit (IMU), social capital (SCP), and irrigation water users (IWU) to examine the evolutionary dynamics and key determinants of the market-based allocation of irrigation water rights. The results show that: (1) The system admits 11 pure-strategy equilibria that are locally asymptotically stable under specific parameter conditions, and $$\\left(\\mathrm{1,1,1,1}\\right)$$ is the primary locally stable outcome under the baseline scenario. (2) System evolution is jointly shaped by the four actors’ initial strategy probabilities, which mainly affect convergence speed and evolutionary trajectories rather than the long-run direction or final equilibrium. (3) Single-factor sensitivity analysis shows that higher service fee, expected return, reward-penalty intensity, repurchase price multiplier, subsidy rates for IMU and SCP, and reputational benefits, together with lower water resources taxes and a moderate reduction in reserved water volume, promote the market-based development of irrigation water-rights trading. (4) Two-factor sensitivity analysis identifies synergies between subsidy rates and reputational benefits, water resources taxes and reward-penalty intensity, expected return and management-technical factors, service fee and irrigation water-use benefits, and repurchase price multiplier and irrigation water-use benefits, with coordinated adjustments improving stability and accelerating convergence. This study provides theoretical and policy insights for improving market-based allocation of water resources and encouraging multi-actor participation in irrigation water-rights trading.