Complexity and the Case for Liberal Neutrality and Skepticism: Aron, Hayek, and Gaus on the Limits of Political Knowledge

This essay identifies an original argument for liberal neutrality and skepticism based on social complexity. Relying on the writings of three authors who represent different strands of liberal thought, Aron, Hayek, and Gaus, I argue we can identify three sources accounting for the limits of our political knowledge: the plurality of the social world, the fragmentation of knowledge, and the impossibility of prediction. Properly acknowledged, these epistemic limits militate for endorsing a political ethic of responsibility grounded in a healthy skepticism toward political action that involves interfering with human affairs in the name of overarching ideals, ends, or values. Though this may give liberalism a conservative tone, conservatism itself is ruled out by a proper understanding of the limits of political knowledge. The essay therefore shows that the ideas of neutrality and restraint, while generally associated with the epistemic abstinence of Rawlsian political liberalism, are not exclusive to it.