Was there ever an Animal Dasein? Heidegger's Concept of Life in the 1924 Aristotle Lecture

Abstract This essay examines Heidegger's interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of life in his 1924 lecture Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy . While scholars have emphasized the text's decisive role in the preparation of Being and Time , their readings have largely centered on the notions of praxis and human existence. Departing from this conventional focus, the article brings attention to a neglected aspect of the lecture: the question of animality and its deep ontological connection to human Dasein . I argue that, in contrast to his later works, especially the 1929–1930 lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude , where an ontological abyss separates the world‐forming human from the poor‐in‐world animal, the Heidegger of 1924 maintains an unexpected ontological continuity between the two. The essay first shows how the generic category of zoe establishes both humans and animals as ‘being‐in‐the‐world’ ( In‐der‐Welt‐sein ) who share an originary mode of ‘being‐with‐one‐another’ ( Miteinandersein ). It then analyzes how this continuity is grounded in a shared affective ‘disposition’ ( Befindlichkeit ), through which the animal exercises a primordial form of ‘having‐oneself’ ( Sich‐selbst‐Habens ). By revisiting this formative moment in Heidegger's thought, the essay challenges the prevailing view of an absolute divide between animal life and human existence as the definitive paradigm of Heidegger's conception of animality.