Financial Leasing as a Policy Instrument for Emergency Green-Energy Security Under Geopolitical Conflict: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Under geopolitical conflicts, the deployment of emergency green energy in energy-import-dependent countries is constrained by limited upfront capital and uncertainty regarding the conflict duration. This study evaluates financial leasing as a policy instrument by combining a benchmark decision model under conventional procurement with a tripartite evolutionary game involving the energy demand side, financial leasing companies, and the government. The results show that conventional procurement creates an underinvestment-idle-capacity dilemma governed by the critical conflict-persistence probability. Financial leasing alleviates financial constraints and redistributes the risks associated with demand uncertainty, producing market-driven and policy-guided stable equilibria. A global grid search shows that the policy-guided basin expands as the conflict-persistence probability increases. However, government subsidies have an inverted-U-shaped effect because their effectiveness is jointly constrained by the demand-side participation condition and the government’s net-benefit condition. The numerical example shows that combining financial leasing with government subsidies reduces the critical conflict-persistence probability for adopting financial leasing from 0.286 to 0.127, a decrease of approximately 56%, and substantially relaxes the feasible upper bound of the risk-sharing coefficient. These findings provide a theoretical basis for the use of financial leasing as a policy instrument to enhance energy security in energy-import-dependent countries and for the design of complementary incentive mechanisms.