Beyond the Board: Does CEO‐CFO Tenure Staggering Curb ESG Greenwashing?

ABSTRACT Greenwashing threatens the credibility of corporate environmental strategies and ESG disclosure by creating a disconnect between symbolic claims and substantive action. Existing research mainly focuses on external pressures and formal governance mechanisms, with limited attention to the relational structure of the top management team. Integrating agency theory and relational perspectives on top management teams, this study conceptualises CEO‐CFO tenure staggering as an informal relational governance condition and examines its association with greenwashing. Using panel data from Chinese A‐share–listed firms from 2011 to 2023, we find that greater CEO‐CFO tenure staggering is associated with a lower greenwashing index. The finding is externally validated through its link to independently observed environmental penalties. Mediation analyses identify performance volatility and investment inefficiency as plausible mediating organisational channels. Moderation results reveal that higher financing constraints weaken this negative association, whereas stronger CFO tournament incentives strengthen it. Subgroup analyses further indicate stronger associations under greater market competition, weaker CEO power and lower board independence; the association is also statistically evident among manufacturing firms. These findings highlight the governance relevance of the CEO‐CFO relationship and offer theoretical and practical insights for strategic environmental management and the credibility of ESG disclosure.