That's Not a Thing : Reification as a Tool for Ethical Critique

ABSTRACT Reification is a social pathology that occurs when we treat social relations as things independent of our collective agency. It is not simply a category mistake, nor is it an isolated error that any single individual can correct. Rather, reification involves a collective and systematic reflexivity deficit caused by the unjust, oppressive, or unhealthy character of our social relations. In this paper, I present my own account of reification as a social pathology and demonstrate its uses—and potential abuses—for ethical critique. Reification distorts individual agency by obscuring our collective powers. I argue that the concept can play three roles in our analyses: diagnostic , etiological , and prescriptive . In relation to each of these functions, I show that the notion is both under‐ and overutilized. First, reification has yet to enter mainstream discourse in Anglophone moral and political philosophy, especially when compared with concepts of similar pedigree, such as ideology and alienation. I seek to rectify this neglect by showing that reification is a valuable addition to analyses of structural injustice, domination, value capture, and inauthenticity. Second, for critical theorists already immersed in historical debates over reification, I warn against the concept's overuse by more clearly circumscribing its critical reach. I propose ways to distinguish reification more carefully from objectification and commodification.