Do people competitively escalate punishments to signal virtue?

Having a moral reputation is vital for success in the social world. One reason that people engage in moral behaviours, from acting generously to punishing those who transgress, is to earn reputational credit. Yet, being seen as moral is not enough, because one must be perceived as more moral than others to be chosen as a social partner. The drive to appear better than others can lead to an arms race of virtuous behaviour, but can this dynamic also apply to moralistic punishment? In a series of pre-registered studies, we tested whether people competitively escalate punishments to signal virtue. In Study 1 (N = 1,036), groups of participants simultaneously made punitive judgments, either expecting to share their decisions with each other or keep them private. We found that people were not more punitive when judgments were public than when they were private. In Studies 2 (N = 412) and 3 (N = 105), chains of participants sequentially made punitive judgments, with each person making their decision upon hearing that of the previous respondent. We found that people were not more likely to escalate the punishment relative to someone else, than they were to reduce it. Across studies, contrary to our predictions, we did not find evidence that people engage in competitive punishment. These results suggest that there may be reputational risks that prevent people from competitively punishing, such as appearing overly punitive or strategically motivated.

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Publication Details

Journal
Open Collections
Published
2026-09-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.14288/1.0456150
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Do people competitively escalate punishments to signal virtue?

Charul Maheshka
Open Collections
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
article

Do people competitively escalate punishments to signal virtue?

Charul Maheshka
article en

Abstract

Having a moral reputation is vital for success in the social world. One reason that people engage in moral behaviours, from acting generously to punishing those who transgress, is to earn reputational credit. Yet, being seen as moral is not enough, because one must be perceived as more moral than others to be chosen as a social partner. The drive to appear better than others can lead to an arms race of virtuous behaviour, but can this dynamic also apply to moralistic punishment? In a series of pre-registered studies, we tested whether people competitively escalate punishments to signal virtue. In Study 1 (N = 1,036), groups of participants simultaneously made punitive judgments, either expecting to share their decisions with each other or keep them private. We found that people were not more punitive when judgments were public than when they were private. In Studies 2 (N = 412) and 3 (N = 105), chains of participants sequentially made punitive judgments, with each person making their decision upon hearing that of the previous respondent. We found that people were not more likely to escalate the punishment relative to someone else, than they were to reduce it. Across studies, contrary to our predictions, we did not find evidence that people engage in competitive punishment. These results suggest that there may be reputational risks that prevent people from competitively punishing, such as appearing overly punitive or strategically motivated.

Open Collections
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 9%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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