Truth and the Limits of Human Cognition_ An Exploration of the Limits of Structural Cognition and the Augustinian Alternative

This study centers on the question, “Can humans fully define truth?” and explores the structural limitations of human cognition and the epistemological possibilities for overcoming them. Although humans seek to investigate and define truth, they face fundamental constraints in fully grasping it due to the structure of human cognition—which relies on the senses and experience—the limitations of spatio-temporal imagination, the cognitive constraints inherent in finite existence, and the self-referential limitations inherent in the very act of attempting to define truth. To examine these issues, this study reviews ancient skepticism, the epistemologies of Descartes and Hume, Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the self-reference problem in modern philosophy of logic, and Tarski’s analysis of the concept of truth. Although these limitations manifest at different levels, they share a common structure. Through this analysis, the study examines the structural limitations on humans’ ability to define truth absolutely, given that humans judge truth solely within their own cognitive structures. However, these limitations do not imply that truth does not exist; while acknowledging the limits of human cognition, this study examines St. Augustine of Hippo’s theory of divine illumination as an alternative that preserves the objectivity of truth. According to the theory of divine illumination, humans do not construct or possess truth on their own but can partially perceive truth that already exists by participating in the divine intellect. In conclusion, this study argues that while truth exists, humans cannot fully define it due to the limitations of their cognitive structures, and that human perception of truth is possible only within a relationship with a transcendent being, while acknowledging these limitations. Through this, the study suggests the possibility of an approach based on Augustine’s theory of illumination as an epistemological model capable of simultaneously explaining the limits of human cognition and the objectivity of truth.