Regulatory capture in Italian port authorities: the case of terminal concessions in Genoa and Trieste

Ports are central to global trade, with 80–90% of traded goods transported by sea. Since the 1990s, liberalization has brought increasing convergence in port governance, with port authorities assuming the role of independent agencies responsible for managing port space through public tenders. Despite their importance, port authorities have received little attention from the perspective of regulatory politics. This exploratory study addresses that gap by focusing on the Italian case. Italy’s maritime sector is characterized by a high density of ports and overlapping catchment areas served by a small number of vertically integrated operators. This creates an oligopsony in the demand for terminal space, exposing Italian port authorities to pressure from carriers and terminal operators and increasing the risk of what we term ‘rivalrous agency capture’. The study compares Genoa and Trieste over the period since 2010. Despite their similarities, Genoa experienced regulatory capture verging on corruption, whereas Trieste experienced sustained and comparatively successful expansion. The article identifies two plausible factors that may account for these divergent outcomes: differences in development prospects and the characteristics of port-authority leadership appointments.