Equilibrium insurance pricing for large losses

Abstract Catastrophe‐exposed P&C insurance markets increasingly confront low‐frequency but high‐severity losses. When such risks interact with costly external financing, insurance pricing depends not only on expected losses but also on insurers' balance‐sheet conditions and capacity constraints. In this paper, we develop a dynamic competitive equilibrium framework of insurance capacity and pricing under jump‐diffusion risk and model uncertainty. We show that catastrophe jumps introduce a liability‐side gamble‐for‐resurrection mechanism through the interaction of limited liability and recapitalization options, which can generate non‐monotonic and non‐smooth pricing patterns under certain conditions. Robustness concerns raise equilibrium prices and capital buffers while attenuating excessive risk‐taking incentives. Using a market‐disciplined calibration, we show that jump risk generates substantial pricing effects beyond expected losses alone and shapes the duration of endogenous underwriting cycles.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Risk & Insurance
Published
2026-09-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70083
Primary Topic
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
article

Equilibrium insurance pricing for large losses

Jan Dhaene, Binzheng Chen, Chun Liu, Sunzhi Pang
Journal of Risk & Insurance
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
article

Equilibrium insurance pricing for large losses

Jan Dhaene, Binzheng Chen, Chun Liu, Sunzhi Pang
article en

Abstract

Abstract Catastrophe‐exposed P&C insurance markets increasingly confront low‐frequency but high‐severity losses. When such risks interact with costly external financing, insurance pricing depends not only on expected losses but also on insurers' balance‐sheet conditions and capacity constraints. In this paper, we develop a dynamic competitive equilibrium framework of insurance capacity and pricing under jump‐diffusion risk and model uncertainty. We show that catastrophe jumps introduce a liability‐side gamble‐for‐resurrection mechanism through the interaction of limited liability and recapitalization options, which can generate non‐monotonic and non‐smooth pricing patterns under certain conditions. Robustness concerns raise equilibrium prices and capital buffers while attenuating excessive risk‐taking incentives. Using a market‐disciplined calibration, we show that jump risk generates substantial pricing effects beyond expected losses alone and shapes the duration of endogenous underwriting cycles.

Journal of Risk & Insurance
Tsinghua University (CN), KU Leuven (BE)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 9%
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.