The effect of judges’ institutional interests on a free press

Abstract Free press protections are fundamental to constitutional democracy, yet their enforcement varies when judges themselves face media scrutiny. Drawing on 658 decisions from eight democratic countries and the European Court of Human Rights, we show that judges are significantly less likely to uphold press rights when coverage targets the judiciary rather than elected officials or bureaucrats. This pattern persists across different constitutional systems and legal traditions, even after accounting for legal doctrine, coverage tone and institutional strength. Using regression analysis, sentiment scoring and qualitative case studies, we demonstrate that judges often invoke distinct justifications when limiting press freedom in these cases. By examining judicial decision-making through the lens of institutional self-interest, this article contributes to scholarship on judicial behavior, comparative constitutional law and freedom of expression. Our findings reveal a fundamental limitation in constitutional governance: rights enforcement weakens when judges face accountability pressures. These dynamics raise serious questions about whether judges can reliably protect critical oversight as democracies worldwide increasingly entrust unelected judges with decisions that shape citizens’ lives.