Contragestive interventions are not abortifacient

This paper attends to a claim that is commonly made in the pro-life literature: that certain secondary mechanisms of action that some forms of contraception may have are abortifacient. Examination of the matter suggests that the relevant mechanism of action—termed contragestion—differs from contraception. However, it is also distinct from what is entailed by an abortion (the termination of a pregnancy). It is therefore inaccurate to label contragestive mechanisms of action abortifacient. Having sketched this view—and having also acknowledged that those who claim contragestive interventions are abortifacient will likely maintain their moral opposition to this mechanism of action regardless—the ethical significance of contragestion is considered in the light of two analogies proposed by Judith Jarvis Thomson, the commonly discussed violinist and the less commonly discussed people-seeds . I conclude that rather than seek to pre-empt discussion by using the term abortifacient, those who consider contragestive interventions morally impermissible should articulate their claims more clearly.