Aggregate-maximising land allocations are rarely individually rational: implications for negotiation between conservation and non-conservation organisations

Abstract Conservation often takes place in landscapes where organisations with conflicting objectives compete for the same land, with each land purchase changing the options available to other actors. Strategic conservation theory suggests that coordination between conservation and non-conservation organisations can avoid conflict and identify potential win-win outcomes. We examined this possibility using simulated landscapes and empirical estimates of carbon storage and timber value from British Columbia, Canada. We first generated a competitive allocation using a sequential heuristic in which the actors anticipate parcels of shared interest. We then reallocated parcels to maximise their combined score while preserving the number assigned to each actor. In the simulated landscapes, coordinated reallocation increased the combined score by an average of 0.51 to 0.53% across alternative turn order rules, but one actor gained while the other lost in 92 to 96% of simulations. In the empirical samples, the mean increase ranged from 1.00 to 1.13%, and coordination did not improve outcomes for both actors in any sample. The combined score achieved through coordination was unaffected by turn order, although turn order influenced how gains and losses were distributed between the actors. Coordinated allocation therefore improved aggregate outcomes but commonly left one organisation worse off than under the competitive allocation. These small and unevenly distributed gains may not be sufficient to offset the transaction costs of coordination.