DIALECTICAL STABILIZATION AS AN EPISTEMIC STRATEGY: A BRIEF ASSESSMENT FROM HEMPEL TO POPPER

AbstractThis article introduces an epistemic strategy termed "dialectical stabilization" to address some long-debated fundamental problems in scientific reasoning (particularly the tensions surrounding verification and universal laws). It is based on the author's concept of 'dialectical stabilization'. The starting point of the study is Carl G. Hempel's distinction between verification and confirmation. The article argues that confirmation theory is not merely a technical or logical refinement, as is often assumed, but rather serves to balance the instabilities that arise in scientific reasoning. In this regard, "confirmation" does not eliminate the problem; instead, it ensures the continuity of scientific discourse by embedding the problem within the theoretical structure. From this perspective, Karl R. Popper's falsificationism can be read as a conscious and principled objection to dialectical stabilization. Popper's emphasis on the "asymmetry" between verification and falsification is not merely a methodological preference but signifies a commitment to a more fragile, riskier epistemic stance regarding the nature of knowledge. In this approach, scientific progress is achieved not by preserving stability but by maintaining openness to error (criticism/falsification). The article uses this contrast between Hempel and Popper not to elevate one side over the other but to rethink an established debate in the philosophy of science from a different perspective. This debate is framed as a choice between epistemic stability and critical openness. The primary contribution of the study lies not in a historical evaluation but in making visible the stabilization mechanisms embedded within certain epistemological approaches. Specifically, it proposes a conceptual framework for understanding how confirmation-based epistemological approaches can persist despite unresolved justification problems. This framework may be functional not only for the philosophy of science but also for analysing ongoing methodological debates in the social sciences. In conclusion, the concept of "dialectical stabilization" addressed in this study will help explain why certain sociocentric and epistemological views remain resistant to criticism despite their gaps, and why this resistance is not easily overcome, even if critics do not find it theoretically convincing. This conceptualization was developed from the intuition that dialectical thought in Marxist theory, in particular, may have assumed a stability-producing (stabilizing) function. The article questions whether this intuition can be used analytically and meaningfully within the context of the philosophy of science (specifically in the contrast between Hempel and Popper).