Dual-Layer Constitutional Architecture and Interdependence: A System for Surfacing and Reconciling Unspoken Norm Conflict

This work-in-progress paper proposes a dual-layer constitutional architecture for societies facing persistent norm conflict. It separates an ultra-rigid Symbolic Constitution (Layer 1), carrying national identity and foundational commitments, from a flexible Basic Law (Layer 2), carrying governance and operative rights. The two layers are designed as interdependent: Layer 1 can remain exceptionally rigid because Layer 2 bears the adaptive burden, while Layer 2’s entrenched core can be released only through Layer 1. The paper further argues that the Layer 1 amendment procedure should function as an “Arena” for surfacing previously unspoken normative incompatibilities. Its purpose is not to manufacture consensus, but to produce an updated map of where adjustment is genuinely impossible and where unexpected cross-group convergence exists. The model is situated within debates on constitutional amendment, unamendability, constituent power, constitutional identity, and deliberative democracy, and is stress-tested against historical and contemporary cases including Germany, France, Chile, and early-twentieth-century Chinese regime transitions. This repository contains the typeset English PDF and Korean- and English-language Markdown manuscripts. Citation and primary-source verification against original documents is ongoing, as expressly noted in the manuscript.