Economic decision-making in collectivist contexts: A qualitative extension of institutionally embedded preference theory among university support staff

While behavioral economics increasingly recognizes social preferences, the mechanisms through which informal institutions and cultural norms shape economic choices in South Asian collectivist contexts are undertheorized. This paper offers a qualitative comparative extension of the institutionally embedded preference frameworks developed by Ali et al. (2026a, 2026b) and Ali, Durrani (2026). Drawing on Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory, we examine how older, non-degree-holding university support staff (N=11; ages 40–70) negotiate financial decision-making under competing material, familial, and reputational constraints. Participant accounts suggest that social honor (izzat) functions as a gender-differentiated form of social currency: women’s decisions are more frequently negotiated against reputational expectations, while men’s decisions are more often shaped by expectations of familial provision. However, the grounded analysis identifies key boundary conditions and extensions: under acute material distress, a Subsistence Mechanism emerges in which reputational concerns and social honor (izzat) become secondary to immediate material and physical needs. Furthermore, participant narratives illustrate an Economics of Sacrifice, in which current financial sacrifices are calibrated not solely around immediate returns but also around anticipated future reciprocity, particularly expectations of relational support in later life. Finally, the findings provide further empirical support for an institutionally constituted view of economic choice, in which informal institutions shape the boundaries and preferences within which economic decisions are made.