Turning political ties into a strategic asset in state-owned enterprises: insights from Turkey

Purpose Western studies often present political ties as constraints in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while China-focused studies more often view them as resources. Turkey's hybrid emerging-market context, combining market pressures with politically embedded governance, provides a theoretically relevant middle ground between these perspectives. Against this background, the present study aims to examine how political ties and managerial capabilities relate to organisational performance in Turkish SOEs. Design/methodology/approach Guided by Upper Echelons Theory (UET) and Dynamic Managerial Capabilities (DMC), the study uses hand-coded biographical and organisational data for four Turkish SOEs (Turkish Airlines, Halkbank, Vakifbank and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)) from 2014 to 2021. It combines qualitative analysis with exploratory panel models (N = 32). The estimates are interpreted as associations and patterns within the four sampled SOEs. Findings Political affiliation does not display a uniform association with return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE). The pattern varies across chair- and board-level measures, performance outcomes and capability configurations, including the chair's relevant educational background. Chair external affiliation is negatively associated with both performance measures, suggesting a potential downside of social capital. These findings support a conditional interpretation of the relationship between political ties and managerial capabilities. Practical implications Taken separately, political affiliation and managerial capabilities do not show consistent associations with stronger performance; their relevance depends on how they combine. Appointment and oversight practices may therefore consider these attributes jointly. Originality/value The study integrates UET and DMC in an underexamined emerging-market SOE context. It distinguishes chair- and board-level political ties and shows why political, human and social capital should not be assumed to have the same performance relevance across managerial configurations.