US ‐China Rivalry and the Global Governance Trilemma: Three Scenarios for World Order

ABSTRACT We examine the consequences of US‐China rivalry for future world order in light of the global governance trilemma. The trilemma captures persistent trade‐offs between three dimensions of global governance: authority, breadth, and universality. The contemporary US‐China rivalry exacerbates the global governance trilemma, making these trade‐offs increasingly acute. Drawing on hegemonic order theories, we argue that the trilemma was attenuated in the post‐Cold War period owing to a hegemonic alignment of power and purpose that enabled the emergence of a relatively universal, broad, and authoritative system of global governance. By putting an end to this hegemonic moment, the US‐China rivalry has led to the revenge of the global governance trilemma. Moving beyond the idea of a shift from rules to power, we use the logic of the trilemma to identify three ideal‐typical scenarios for the coming world order: a world of clubs, a world of deals, and a world of thin governance.

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Publication Details

Journal
Global Policy
Published
2026-09-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70209
Primary Topic
Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

US ‐China Rivalry and the Global Governance Trilemma: Three Scenarios for World Order

Steven Langendonk, Matthew D. Stephen, Steve Biedermann
Global Policy
Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism
article

US ‐China Rivalry and the Global Governance Trilemma: Three Scenarios for World Order

Steven Langendonk, Matthew D. Stephen, Steve Biedermann
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT We examine the consequences of US‐China rivalry for future world order in light of the global governance trilemma. The trilemma captures persistent trade‐offs between three dimensions of global governance: authority, breadth, and universality. The contemporary US‐China rivalry exacerbates the global governance trilemma, making these trade‐offs increasingly acute. Drawing on hegemonic order theories, we argue that the trilemma was attenuated in the post‐Cold War period owing to a hegemonic alignment of power and purpose that enabled the emergence of a relatively universal, broad, and authoritative system of global governance. By putting an end to this hegemonic moment, the US‐China rivalry has led to the revenge of the global governance trilemma. Moving beyond the idea of a shift from rules to power, we use the logic of the trilemma to identify three ideal‐typical scenarios for the coming world order: a world of clubs, a world of deals, and a world of thin governance.

Global Policy
Helmut Schmidt University (DE)
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism
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