The Adventures of Seeing-as in Cinema: A Philosophical Investigation Between Phenomenology and Grammar

This article offers a philosophical investigation into the phenomenon of seeing-as within the experience of cinema, through a dialogue between phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s grammatical method. It seeks to question the myth of direct access to an experience independent of language and technical apparatuses, and instead proposes an analysis of the complex relations between language, perception, and human practices. The study first examines the relationship between seeing-as and intentionality, questioning the possibility of a phenomenological account of aspect perception. Although seeing-as appears close to certain analyses of form (Gestalt), particularly because of its interpretative character, cinema reveals the limits of an approach grounded solely in natural perception. The cinematic image introduces a technical, symbolic, and temporal dimension that transforms our way of seeing. Through an analysis of Rear Window, the article argues that film does not merely reproduce a perceptual experience: the apparatuses of recording and editing produce meanings of their own. Cinema thus becomes a privileged field for examining how our ways of perceiving are shaped by techniques, signs, and forms of life.