The Persistence of Power: A Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Transition
This paper develops a theory of political persistence by introducing the Odero Persistent Axiom as the underlying mechanism governing complex social and political systems. The central claim is that hegemonic stability is determined not by absolute stocks of power, but by whether information-directed control and resource throughput exceed systemic decay. Traditional international relations theories predominantly model static stocks of power, such as GDP and military size, rather than continuous operational rates. Building upon the foundational derivation from the Odero Persistent Axiom, the framework progresses from Persistence Capacity (P) to the Persistence Index (Ω = P/D) and Persistence Velocity (ω = dΩ/dt), providing a unified diagnostic for system stability. The paper argues that hegemonic transition is fundamentally a relational process driven by relative persistence trajectories rather than absolute domestic collapse. A challenger overtakes an incumbent when its Persistence Index structurally surpasses that of the incumbent, regardless of whether the incumbent remains internally stable. The framework operationalizes information-directed control through decision accuracy, feedback fidelity, and decision timeliness, integrating control theory, systems analysis, and political dynamics into a general persistence framework. Qualitative illustrations drawn from Kenya (2024) and Venezuela demonstrate how the framework can interpret persistence recovery and persistence collapse across different political contexts. The paper is presented as a theoretical contribution intended to establish the logic, derivation, and implications of the Persistence Framework. Empirical estimation of persistence variables, historical testing, and quantitative forecasting applications are identified as future research directions.
Authors
- John Otieno Odero (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-7039-7209)
Institutions
- Persistent Systems (India) (IN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-08-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22134045
- Primary Topic
- Political Conflict and Governance
- Type
- preprint