Transparency without coherence: a doctrinal analysis of Malawi’s Access to Information Act

Abstract The global diffusion of the right of access to information (ATI) laws has been widely promoted as a cornerstone of transparency, accountability, and democratic governance. Yet, growing evidence suggests that the formal adoption of such legislation does not necessarily translate into substantive institutional change. This perspective examines Malawi’s Access to Information Act through a theory-informed doctrinal analysis, asking whether it represents a genuine instrument of accountability or a case of transparency without accountability. Drawing on international benchmarks, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Model Law and the Article 19 Principles on Freedom of Information, the study systematically evaluates the extent to which Malawi’s ATI framework aligns with global standards across key dimensions, including disclosure obligations, scope of exemptions, oversight mechanisms, and enforcement provisions. While the findings reveal substantial formal convergence with international norms, they also expose critical design features: broad exemptions, executive discretion, and weak institutional oversight that constrain the law’s transformative potential. Interpreting these patterns through a political economy lens, the perspective argues that Malawi’s ATI Act reflects a strategically negotiated institutional arrangement in which commitments to transparency coexist with incentives for information control. In doing so, the study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that ATI laws are not merely technical governance tools, but politically mediated outcomes shaped by elite interests, state capacity, and institutional context. The findings highlight the need to move beyond legal adoption as a metric of reform and instead focus on how institutional design structures the effectiveness of transparency regimes in emerging democracies.