Driverless, not thoughtless? Automated vehicle regulation, the dilemma of control, and the prospect of dual corrigibility

When regulating emerging technologies, authorities must balance available knowledge, means for control, and desirable directions of development. The article asks which normative orientation guides Norway's automated vehicle regulation, how the regulation is configured, and whether this regulatory strategy aligns with the underpinning normative orientation. To answer these questions, the article analyses the policy-making process preceding Norway's Act Relating to Testing of Self-Driving Vehicles, the content of the finalised Act, and interview data from the first automated vehicle trial conducted after the Act's effectuation. The article shows that Norway pursues a two-stage regulatory strategy. During the first stage, interested parties may organise automated vehicle trials; during the second stage, the state will establish a permanent regulation for automated vehicles. This two-stage strategy builds upon the untenable assumption that practical concerns regarding a technology's functioning can be addressed separately from normative concerns. Drawing upon David Collingridge's writings on the dilemma of control, the article argues that practical and normative concerns must be processed in parallel and suggests dual corrigibility – corrigibility of decisions and corrigibility of orientation – as a guiding principle for regulating emerging technologies.