The Mathematics of Why I Don't Email People About My Work

A formal academic satire modelling the decision‑theoretic, probabilistic, and behavioural‑geometric reasons I refuse to email anyone about my research. The analysis incorporates empirical data including: (i) a non‑zero probability that my work is genuinely novel, (ii) four consecutive academic non‑responses, (iii) one anomalous reply attempting to sell me a pay‑to‑play website, and (iv) repeated institutional communication failures involving the council, the ombudsman, and my local MP. The resulting mathematical framework demonstrates that emailing has strictly negative expected utility and that non‑communication is the unique stable equilibrium. Core equations are included below. \[U(E) = R(E) - C(E) - F(E) - P(E)\] Where:- \(R(E) \to 0\) is the expected academic reward,- \(C(E) \to \infty\) is the cognitive cost,- \(F(E) = 1\) is the institutional failure probability,- \(P(E) = 1\) is the commercial‑harassment probability. Thus: \[U(E) < 0 \quad \text{for all email actions } E.\] The paper concludes that writing another mathematical paper about pissing on shit is statistically preferable to sending an email. Keywords: decision theory of communication, academic non‑response dynamics, novelty–indifference paradox, institutional failure modelling, council communication breakdown, ombudsman escalation behaviour, MP delegation failure, pay‑to‑play correspondence anomaly, behavioural geometry of email avoidance, negative utility functions, cognitive cost divergence, social‑manifold curvature, Carlo Stability Criterion, stochastic communication failure, academic satire, mathematical modelling of non‑communication, research dissemination behaviour, probability of commercial harassment, equilibrium analysis of email refusal. Contact: For enquiries or research questions related to this work, email [email protected]