The Virtue of Bias? China’s Stakeholder Mediation in the Iran and North Korea Nuclear Crises

Why does China mediate differently across similar security crises? Challenging mediation theory’s neutrality assumption, this article conceptualises ‘stakeholder mediation’ as engagement by third parties whose security, economic, or reputational interests are exposed to a conflict’s outcome. Such mediators hold leverage but risk entrapment and reputational costs. Using a most-similar design, process tracing, diplomat memoirs, declassified documents, and elite interviews, we examine China’s role in the North Korean and Iranian nuclear crises. Despite structural similarities, China adopted markedly different postures. Variation in stake exposure shapes risk calculations, entry timing, and leverage strategies: high immediate security stakes in Korea raised China’s intervention threshold through entrapment fears, whereas economic and reputational stakes in Iran lowered the risks of early multilateral engagement, while US–China relations operated as a scope condition.