Minilateralism by rational design of international institutions: the QUAD as a response to ARF and EAS limitations

This article explains why the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was revived after 2017 and why it assumed a minilateral rather than a broader multilateral form. It integrates the rational design of international institutions with minilateralism to distinguish the geopolitical conditions generating demand for additional cooperation from the institutional design choices shaping the resulting arrangement. Methodologically, the study employs a structured qualitative comparison and chronological narrative analysis of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and QUAD. It applies five design variables – membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility – to their institutional development and operation. The comparison shows that all three arrangements are intergovernmental, weakly centralized, and predominantly non-binding. Their different institutional consequences arise from how the five variables interact. ARF and EAS combine broad, heterogeneous participation with ASEAN-centred procedures and extensive agendas, strengthening regional representation and dialogue but increasing coordination costs. QUAD combines restricted membership and partial preference convergence with direct member-state control and flexible, project-based cooperation. Its relative responsiveness therefore derives neither from greater centralization nor from a uniformly narrow agenda, but from a design configuration that facilitates practical adaptation. QUAD consequently supplements rather than replaces ASEAN-centred institutions by addressing selected coordination and implementation problems.