Corporate governance of listed subsidiaries: principal-principal challenges for multinational enterprises in emerging markets

Purpose This paper aims to expand our understanding of the principal-principal (P-P) conflicts that can arise when multinational enterprises (MNEs) have subsidiaries listed in emerging markets. By identifying common contexts and actors involved in these conflicts and applying a systems theory lens, it furthers our understanding of how P-P conflicts arise and how they can be mitigated. Design/methodology/approach Ten MNEs and their 32 majority-owned subsidiaries listed on stock exchanges in Asia and Africa are investigated through qualitative case studies of P-P conflict events reported in the media. Archival materials are the main source of data with findings sense-checked through interviews with local governance experts. Findings The paper reveals four situations where P-P conflicts between MNEs and local shareholders commonly arise: buy-outs, related party transactions, restructurings and decisions that create intra-group competition. It also identifies four groups of governance actors involved in P-P conflicts: market analysts; regulators; shareholder groups; and boards of directors. It shows that P-P conflicts are mitigated by information exchange – feedback loops facilitated by these actors help to resolve information asymmetries. Practical implications The findings of the paper have implications for both policy-makers and investors in emerging markets. Policy makers should consider how information exchange can be encouraged in each of the common contexts for P-P conflicts by requiring disclosure and facilitating shareholder engagement. Investors can gain confidence in markets with a culture of shareholder activism and a strong financial media which can offset weaknesses in legal institutions. Originality/value The paper argues that the transnational complexities involved when an MNC has a listed subsidiary in an emerging market call for a systems theory approach to understanding corporate governance. Systems theory has not previously been applied to P-P conflicts yet provides a promising way to take into account the interactions between national governance bundles and the role of both formal and informal mechanisms in mitigating or resolving P-P conflicts.

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Publication Details

Journal
Corporate Governance
Published
2026-08-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-10-2025-0819
Primary Topic
International Business and FDI
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Corporate governance of listed subsidiaries: principal-principal challenges for multinational enterprises in emerging markets

Alice Klettner
Corporate Governance
International Business and FDI
article

Corporate governance of listed subsidiaries: principal-principal challenges for multinational enterprises in emerging markets

Alice Klettner
article en

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to expand our understanding of the principal-principal (P-P) conflicts that can arise when multinational enterprises (MNEs) have subsidiaries listed in emerging markets. By identifying common contexts and actors involved in these conflicts and applying a systems theory lens, it furthers our understanding of how P-P conflicts arise and how they can be mitigated. Design/methodology/approach Ten MNEs and their 32 majority-owned subsidiaries listed on stock exchanges in Asia and Africa are investigated through qualitative case studies of P-P conflict events reported in the media. Archival materials are the main source of data with findings sense-checked through interviews with local governance experts. Findings The paper reveals four situations where P-P conflicts between MNEs and local shareholders commonly arise: buy-outs, related party transactions, restructurings and decisions that create intra-group competition. It also identifies four groups of governance actors involved in P-P conflicts: market analysts; regulators; shareholder groups; and boards of directors. It shows that P-P conflicts are mitigated by information exchange – feedback loops facilitated by these actors help to resolve information asymmetries. Practical implications The findings of the paper have implications for both policy-makers and investors in emerging markets. Policy makers should consider how information exchange can be encouraged in each of the common contexts for P-P conflicts by requiring disclosure and facilitating shareholder engagement. Investors can gain confidence in markets with a culture of shareholder activism and a strong financial media which can offset weaknesses in legal institutions. Originality/value The paper argues that the transnational complexities involved when an MNC has a listed subsidiary in an emerging market call for a systems theory approach to understanding corporate governance. Systems theory has not previously been applied to P-P conflicts yet provides a promising way to take into account the interactions between national governance bundles and the role of both formal and informal mechanisms in mitigating or resolving P-P conflicts.

Corporate GovernanceVol. 26(9)
University of Technology Sydney (AU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
International Business and FDI
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