Explicit attacks on differential phase shift quantum key distribution

In the well-established framework of quantum key distribution (QKD), differential phase shift (DPS) protocols have known information-theoretic security bounds defining tolerable error rates under optimal adversaries. In this work, we revisit the security of 3- and $$n$$ -pulse DPS QKD by explicitly analyzing two specific, physically implementable individual attacks: minimum error discrimination (MED) and quantum cloning. Using semidefinite programming, we characterize these attacks in detail and quantify their induced quantum bit error rates (QBER) and resulting secure key rates under realistic system assumptions. The critical QBER thresholds for these attacks are approximately 20%, significantly higher than the theoretical lower bounds of 6% for individual and 4% for coherent attacks, indicating these are suboptimal adversarial strategies. This study primarily serves as a practical exercise to benchmark known attacks, providing explicit measures that aid experimental validation, protocol calibration, and risk assessment within current technological capabilities. Additionally, we explore finite-size effects and the effectiveness of phase randomization in weak coherent source-based protocols as protection against unambiguous state discrimination attacks.