Existentializing Georg Simmel’s Sociology Through the New Phenomenology

Abstract The paper aims to reformulate two selected aspects of Georg Simmel’s concept of society and sociation by referring to New Phenomenology, founded by the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz. These are 1) the feeling of being an ‘I’, and 2), the reality of finding oneself involuntar-ily immersed in dynamics of sociation. Simmel’s Kantian approach regards these phenomena epistemologically problematic because they are not a result of symbol-mediated representation of consciousness but nevertheless experienced as subjectively evident. Hence, due to epistemo-logical imponderabilities and the historical context of sociology as a nascent discipline, Simmel decided to define these somehow involuntarily felt phenomena as beyond disciplinary borders. However, as the article argues, this puts Simmel’s approach at risk for losing the entanglement between the concretely acting and sensing entities on the one hand, and the forms that emerge from these interactions on the other; an aspect that has been prominently criticized by authors of critical theory. Phenomenologically speaking, what is lost in Simmel’s approach is a first-person perspective in the sense of an understanding for the sphere of existing as this unique and con-crete person that finds itself immersed in sociating processes. To existentialize Simmel’s sociol-ogy hence means to develop a theoretically coherent and empirically founded understanding of this conceptual lack. For this purpose, the article turns to the concepts of ‘strict subjectivity’ and ‘embodied communication’ taken from New Phenomenology. Along this the oretical conjunction a promising approach emerges, which can contribute to sociological debates revolving around the existential challenges of contemporary society.