Informality, power and governance in the global value chain of Brazil nuts in Brazil and Bolivia

Purpose How does governance in global value chains (GVC) work when their main coordination and control mechanisms rely on power asymmetries rather than formal institutions? This study aims to examine a case study set in a context typical of informality and institutional fragility in developing economies: the global Brazil nut value chain. Design/methodology/approach This research adopts a qualitative approach to analyze the governance of the global Brazil nut chain in contexts of structural informality and power asymmetries. Fieldwork was conducted in Brazil and Bolivia, covering multiple links of the chain. In Brazil, data included records of extractivists, focus groups, interviews and a validation roundtable. In Bolivia, in-depth interviews were conducted with processing industries. The analysis combined primary data with secondary trade statistics and focused on extractivist insertion, informal coordination by intermediaries and strategies of formalization. Triangulation of sources, methods and contexts strengthened credibility and consistency. Findings The findings highlight a paradox in the sustainability: while the product is globally valued for being “sustainable,” extractivists remain invisible, excluded and subject to precarious working conditions, demonstrating that formal sustainability does not always translate into social justice at the base of the chain. This tension between economic value and social welfare reflects the paradoxical dynamic identified by Hahn et al. (2018), in which multiple imperatives coexist in a conflicting manner, showing that the global legitimacy of sustainable products can coexist with the perpetuation of structural inequalities. Originality/value The institutional invisibility of extractivists within formal systems of traceability, contracts and audits does not exclude them from GVC governance; instead, it incorporates them as silent absorbers of the costs and risks of compliance through price compression, the intensification of unpaid labor and increasing dependence on intermediaries.