Complete Attack Plan on Hardware of an IoT Chip
This working paper examines the security vulnerabilities of an Internet of Things (IoT) system that relies on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for authentication and True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) for cryptographic key generation. The study develops a comprehensive hardware attack strategy in which an adversary combines side-channel analysis, machine learning-based PUF modeling, and fault injection techniques targeting voltage and temperature-sensitive TRNGs. The paper evaluates how these attacks can be used to predict or recover temporary session keys, bypass authentication mechanisms, and ultimately decrypt protected communications between an IoT node and a cloud server. Furthermore, it assesses the relative weaknesses of the authentication and encryption stages and discusses practical countermeasures, including enhanced PUF architectures, entropy monitoring, side-channel protections, trusted hardware modules, and secure execution environments. The analysis highlights the importance of hardware security in modern cryptographic systems and resource-constrained IoT devices.
Authors
- Pagratios Papadopoulos
Institutions
- University of West Attica (GR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-08-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22028710
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00