Talking when the stakes are high: Mediation, UN peacekeeping, and government violence against civilians

Research suggests that mediation can increase government violence against civilians, but the conditions shaping this effect remain insufficiently specified. Drawing on prospect theory, I argue that when mediation addresses core incompatibilities, that is, issues over political authority or territorial control, governments anticipate status quo losses and adopt risky strategies, including civilian targeting, to strengthen their bargaining position. I expect UN peacekeepers to mitigate this escalation through reinforcing dynamics. Mediation on core incompatibilities makes government attempts to obstruct UN peacekeepers politically costly, as such behavior can cast doubt on governments’ commitment to the mediation process. As obstruction becomes harder to sustain, the military and political costs associated with UN peacekeeping are more likely to materialize. Under these conditions, civilian targeting undermines, rather than strengthens, governments’ bargaining position. Panel analyses of intrastate armed conflicts in Africa (1993–2007) show that government killings escalate following mediation on core incompatibilities, but this escalation weakens as UN peacekeeping deployments increase and levels off at larger deployment sizes. These findings clarify when government violence against civilians is most likely to follow mediation and demonstrate how complementary conflict management tools can constrain civilian harm.