Complete Attack Plan on Hardware of an IoT Chip

This working paper examines the security vulnerabilities of an Internet of Things (IoT) system that relies on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for authentication and True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) for cryptographic key generation. The study develops a comprehensive hardware attack strategy in which an adversary combines side-channel analysis, machine learning-based PUF modeling, and fault injection techniques targeting voltage and temperature-sensitive TRNGs. The paper evaluates how these attacks can be used to predict or recover temporary session keys, bypass authentication mechanisms, and ultimately decrypt protected communications between an IoT node and a cloud server. Furthermore, it assesses the relative weaknesses of the authentication and encryption stages and discusses practical countermeasures, including enhanced PUF architectures, entropy monitoring, side-channel protections, trusted hardware modules, and secure execution environments. The analysis highlights the importance of hardware security in modern cryptographic systems and resource-constrained IoT devices.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-08-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22028711
Primary Topic
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Complete Attack Plan on Hardware of an IoT Chip

Pagratios Papadopoulos
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
article

Complete Attack Plan on Hardware of an IoT Chip

Pagratios Papadopoulos
article en

Abstract

This working paper examines the security vulnerabilities of an Internet of Things (IoT) system that relies on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for authentication and True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) for cryptographic key generation. The study develops a comprehensive hardware attack strategy in which an adversary combines side-channel analysis, machine learning-based PUF modeling, and fault injection techniques targeting voltage and temperature-sensitive TRNGs. The paper evaluates how these attacks can be used to predict or recover temporary session keys, bypass authentication mechanisms, and ultimately decrypt protected communications between an IoT node and a cloud server. Furthermore, it assesses the relative weaknesses of the authentication and encryption stages and discusses practical countermeasures, including enhanced PUF architectures, entropy monitoring, side-channel protections, trusted hardware modules, and secure execution environments. The analysis highlights the importance of hardware security in modern cryptographic systems and resource-constrained IoT devices.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
University of West Attica (GR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Complete Attack Plan on Hardware of an IoT Chip — Pagratios Papadopoulos · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS